Landmark judgments on the POCSO Act in favour of accused highlight cases where courts acquitted the accused due to lack of evidence, false allegations, or procedural lapses, reinforcing the need for balanced justice and safeguarding the rights of both victims and the falsely accused. 

The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, enacted in 2012, marked a significant advancement in India’s legal framework to safeguard minors from sexual abuse. It was designed to be strict, child-centric, and comprehensive in its approach to prosecuting offenders. Over the years, this law has played a vital role in securing justice for victims and addressing long-overlooked issues of child protection.

However, the seriousness of POCSO charges also imposes a substantial burden on the accused. The law’s rigid provisions and the sensitive nature of these cases often leave little space for nuance or context. In many situations, mere allegations have led to social stigma, emotional distress, and professional consequences for the person accused. Courts have even identified cases where the POCSO Act was misused, particularly in family disputes, personal vendettas, or situations arising from misunderstandings.

A fair legal system must strike a balance, not only punishing the guilty but also protecting the innocent from wrongful prosecution. Over the past decade, Indian courts have played a critical role in upholding this balance. Several landmark judgements on the POCSO Act in favour of the accused have been delivered by the High Courts and the Supreme Court, where the evidence was insufficient, procedural errors were evident, or the allegations were found to be false or exaggerated.

What is POCSO?

The POCSO Act stands for the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. It is a special law enacted by the Indian Parliament to protect children (any person below 18 years of age) from sexual abuse and exploitation.

Features of the POCSO Act:

1. Comprehensive Definition of Offences: It defines various forms of sexual offences against children, including penetrative and non-penetrative assault, sexual harassment, and pornography.
2. Child-Friendly Procedures: The Act mandates child-friendly procedures during investigation and trial, including special courts, in-camera proceedings, and avoiding repeated statements.
3. Mandatory Reporting: Anyone who suspects or is aware of a sexual offence against a child is legally required to report it. Failure to do so can lead to punishment.
4. Burden of Proof: The law shifts the burden of proof onto the accused, meaning they must prove their innocence once charged.
5. Time-Bound Trials: The Act requires that the trial be completed within one year of the court taking cognizance of the offence.
6. Punishments: It prescribes stringent punishments, including life imprisonment, depending on the severity of the offence.

The POCSO Act was designed to fill gaps in the existing criminal laws and provide a structured, sensitive, and robust legal mechanism to deal with child sexual abuse cases in India.

Historical Background of the POCSO Act

Before the enactment of the POCSO Act in 2012, India lacked a specific law dedicated solely to addressing sexual offences against children. Child victims were often forced to seek justice under general provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which were not designed with their unique vulnerabilities in mind. These laws did not even define child sexual abuse comprehensively and failed to cover several forms of non-penetrative or exploitative acts. As a result, many cases either went unreported or were poorly prosecuted.

Recognizing this gap, the need for a focused legal framework became evident. Reports by the Law Commission of India, growing public concern, and most importantly, the findings of a 2007 national study by the Ministry of Women and Child Development, revealed alarming statistics. That study found that over 53 percent of children in India had faced some form of sexual abuse, yet very few cases reached courts, and even fewer ended in conviction.

There was also growing pressure from international obligations. India is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which mandates child-friendly justice systems and protection against all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse.

To address these concerns, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Bill was introduced and passed by the Indian Parliament in 2012. It came into force on November 14, 2012, coinciding with Children’s Day, symbolizing the nation’s commitment to child protection.

The Act marked a turning point in India’s approach to child rights and criminal justice. For the first time, the legal system formally acknowledged that children require special procedures, protections, and sensitivity when they are victims of sexual crimes.

10+ Landmark Judgements On POCSO Act In Favour Of Accused

#1 Satish Ragde v. State of Maharashtra (2021)

• Court: Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench)
• Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 161 of 2020

Summary:

In this case, the appellant, Satish Ragde, was accused of sexually assaulting a 12-year-old girl. The prosecution alleged that Ragde had taken the girl to his house under the pretext of giving her guava and then pressed her breast over her clothes. He was charged under Section 8 of the POCSO Act, which pertains to sexual assault.

The primary legal question was whether the act of pressing the breast over clothing constituted “sexual assault” under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. Section 7 defines sexual assault as when a person, with sexual intent, touches the vagina, penis, anus, or breast of the child or makes the child touch the same of such person or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration.

The defense argued that since there was no “skin-to-skin” contact, the act did not fulfill the criteria for sexual assault under the POCSO Act. The Bombay High Court accepted this argument, stating that the absence of direct physical contact (i.e., skin-to-skin) meant that the act did not amount to sexual assault under Section 7. Consequently, the court acquitted Ragde under the POCSO Act but convicted him under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which deals with assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty.

• Key Legal Issue: Interpretation of “physical contact” in the definition of sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO Act and whether “skin-to-skin” contact is necessary.
• Outcome: The High Court’s interpretation led to the acquittal of the accused under the POCSO Act, sparking widespread debate and criticism for potentially narrowing the scope of protection intended by the Act.

Source: Indian Kanoon

#2 Attorney General for India v. Satish and Another (2021)

• Court: Supreme Court of India
• Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 1410 of 2021
• Date of Judgment: 18 November 2021
• Bench: Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, and Justice Bela M. Trivedi
• Source: India Kanoon

Background:

This case arose from the controversial judgment of the Bombay High Court in Satish Ragde v. State of Maharashtra, where the High Court acquitted the accused under Section 8 of the POCSO Act, holding that “skin-to-skin” contact was necessary to constitute sexual assault under Section 7 of the Act. The High Court’s interpretation led to widespread criticism and concerns about the potential narrowing of the Act’s protective scope.

Facts:

The accused, Satish, lured a 12-year-old girl to his house under the pretext of offering her guava. Once inside, he pressed her breast over her clothes and attempted to remove her salwar. When the victim tried to scream, he covered her mouth and locked her in a room. The victim’s mother, upon hearing her daughter’s cries, rescued her and reported the incident to the police.

The Special Court convicted Satish under Sections 342, 354, and 363 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 8 of the POCSO Act. However, the Bombay High Court, in appeal, acquitted him under the POCSO Act, reasoning that the absence of direct skin-to-skin contact meant the act did not qualify as sexual assault under Section 7.

Legal Issues:

• Whether “skin-to-skin” contact is a prerequisite for an act to be considered sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO Act.
• The proper interpretation of “physical contact” and “touch” within the context of the Act.
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Supreme Court’s Analysis:

The Supreme Court critically examined the High Court’s interpretation and emphasized the legislative intent behind the POCSO Act—to provide a robust legal framework for the protection of children from sexual offenses. The Court noted that Section 7 of the Act defines sexual assault as:

“Whoever, with sexual intent, touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration.”

The Court observed that the term “touch” is used concerning specific body parts, while “physical contact” pertains to any other act done with sexual intent. Importantly, the Court held that interpreting “physical contact” to mean only “skin-to-skin” contact would lead to an absurd and narrow understanding of the law, undermining its purpose.

The Court invoked the legal maxim Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat, which suggests that a statute should be interpreted to give effect to its purpose rather than render it ineffective. Applying this, the Court concluded that the High Court’s interpretation was flawed and that any physical contact with sexual intent, regardless of whether it involved skin-to-skin contact, falls within the ambit of sexual assault under Section 7.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s acquittal under the POCSO Act and reinstated the conviction under Section 8. The Court sentenced Satish to rigorous imprisonment for three years and imposed a fine. The Court also reaffirmed the convictions under Sections 342, 354, and 363 of the IPC.

Significance:

This landmark judgment clarified the interpretation of “physical contact” under the POCSO Act, ensuring that the law’s protective scope is not unduly narrowed. By emphasizing that sexual intent, rather than the nature of physical contact, is the crucial element in determining sexual assault, the Court reinforced the Act’s objective to safeguard children from sexual offenses.

#3 Hari Dev Acharya @ Pranavanand & Ors. v. State (2021)

• Court: Delhi High Court
• Citation: CRL.M.C. 6530/2018 & CRL.M.A. 50336/2018
• Date of Judgment: 12 November 2021
• Presiding Judge: Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri
• Source: Indian Kanoon

Background

In this case, the petitioners, including Hari Dev Acharya, were accused of committing multiple offenses under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. The allegations involved separate incidents of sexual assault against a minor, reported to have occurred over a period of time. The prosecution sought to conduct a joint trial for these offenses, treating them as part of the same transaction.

The defense challenged this approach, arguing that each incident was distinct and should be tried separately. They contended that combining the charges in a single trial would prejudice the accused and violate their right to a fair trial.

Legal Issues

The primary legal question was whether multiple offenses under the POCSO Act, alleged to have occurred on different occasions, could be tried jointly. The court examined the applicability of Sections 218, 219, and 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which deal with the joinder of charges and joint trials.

Section 218 mandates separate charges for distinct offenses, but Sections 219 and 223 provide exceptions, allowing joint trials if the offenses are of the same kind and committed within a specific timeframe or if they form part of the same transaction.

Court’s Analysis

Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri analyzed the provisions of the CrPC and relevant case law to determine the permissibility of a joint trial in this context. The court noted that the POCSO Act does not explicitly address the issue of joint trials for multiple offenses. Therefore, the general provisions of the CrPC would apply.

The court emphasized that the key consideration is whether the offenses are part of the “same transaction.” If the incidents are connected by proximity of time, place, or continuity of action, they may be tried together to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and ensure judicial efficiency.

In this case, the court found that the alleged offenses were sufficiently linked to constitute the same transaction. The continuity of the alleged conduct and the relationship between the accused and the victim supported this conclusion.

Decision

The Delhi High Court held that a joint trial for the multiple offenses alleged against the petitioners was permissible under the CrPC. The court dismissed the petitioners’ challenge, allowing the prosecution to proceed with a consolidated trial.

Significance

This judgment clarifies the applicability of joint trials in cases involving multiple offenses under the POCSO Act. It underscores that when the Act is silent on procedural aspects, the provisions of the CrPC govern the conduct of trials. The decision promotes judicial economy and consistency in verdicts by allowing joint trials for offenses forming part of the same transaction.

However, the court also highlighted the importance of safeguarding the accused’s right to a fair trial. It acknowledged that joint trials should not be conducted if they cause undue prejudice to the defense. Therefore, courts must carefully assess the facts of each case to determine the appropriateness of a joint trial.

#3 Azhar @ Azharuddin @ Md. Azharuddin v. The State by Women Police Station, Davanagere (Criminal Appeal No. 404 of 2019)

• Court: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru
• Judge: Justice Mohammad Nawaz
• Date: May 5, 2020
• Outcome: The accused (appellant, Azharuddin) was acquitted of charges under Sections 376 (rape), 313 (causing miscarriage without consent), and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the IPC, and Section 6 (aggravated penetrative sexual assault) of the POCSO Act, 2012.
• Source: India Kanoon

Key Reasons for Acquittal:

1. Inconsistencies in Prosecution Evidence: The court found material contradictions between the First Information Report (FIR), the victim’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and her testimony. The FIR did not mention the victim being made unconscious with juice, a claim introduced later, which undermined the prosecution’s narrative of forcible assault.
2. Lack of Evidence of Force or Threat: The victim’s repeated visits to the accused’s house without resistance, as corroborated by neighbors (PW7 and PW8), suggested consensual interaction. The court noted the absence of evidence showing the accused threatened the victim or her family to coerce her into sexual acts.
3. Doubt on Victim’s Age: The prosecution relied on a birth certificate (Ex.P18) to prove the victim was a minor (aged ~17 years). However, the court questioned its authenticity, as the victim’s parents lived in Davanagere, not Hanagal (where the certificate was issued). Medical evidence (X-ray and dental reports) estimated the victim’s age as 18–21 years, indicating she was likely not a minor, negating the applicability of POCSO Act provisions.
4. Unsubstantiated Abortion Claims: The prosecution failed to prove the accused forcibly administered tablets causing an abortion. The victim admitted consuming the tablets at home, and no investigation identified the tablets or confirmed their role in the abortion. Medical evidence suggested the abortion might have resulted from a gynecologist’s intervention, as the victim’s mother conducted a pregnancy test and consulted a doctor before the complaint.
5. Suppression of Evidence: The prosecution suppressed key medical reports (X-ray and dental) and failed to produce hospital records or the testimony of an NGO worker mentioned in the FIR, weakening the case.
6. Negative Toxicology Report: The toxicology report (Ex.P21) found no traces of sedatives or abortifacient drugs, contradicting claims of the victim being drugged or induced to abort.
7. Defense Plausibility: While the defense’s claim of a counter-complaint against the victim’s father was not proven, the presence of the accused at the police station before the FIR suggested potential ulterior motives in the complaint.

Legal Reasoning: The court emphasized the prosecution’s burden to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Inconsistencies, lack of corroborative evidence, and doubts about the victim’s age and consent led to the conclusion that the sexual acts were not proven to be non-consensual or under the POCSO Act’s purview. The court found the trial court’s conviction improper, as it did not adequately consider these evidentiary gaps.

Order: The conviction and sentence dated January 21 and 24, 2019, by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Davanagere, were set aside. The accused was acquitted and ordered to be released unless required in another case. Any fine paid was to be refunded.

#4 State of Karnataka v. Raju S/o Mallappa Hosamani (2020)

• Court: Karnataka High Court (Dharwad Bench)
• Date: September 10, 2020
• Judges: Justice B.M. Shyam Prasad and Justice M.G. Uma
• Source: India Kanoon

Details: The accused, Raju Hosamani, was acquitted of charges under Section 361 of the IPC (kidnapping from lawful guardianship) and Section 4 of the POCSO Act (penetrative sexual assault). The prosecution alleged that the accused kidnapped a 15-year-old girl on November 30, 2013, and committed sexual assault under the pretext of marriage.

The trial court had convicted the accused under Section 361 IPC and Section 4 POCSO Act but acquitted him of charges under Sections 363, 368, 376(2)(h) and (i) IPC, and Section 5(j)(ii)(l) POCSO Act.

The Karnataka High Court, on appeal, set aside the convictions, ruling in favor of the accused. The court found that the prosecution failed to prove the victim was a minor at the time of the incident, a critical element for POCSO charges. The victim (PW3) testified she was a major, had voluntarily gone with the accused due to their mutual affection, and was married to him with children.

The birth certificate (Ex.P10) was unreliable as it was not from the first school attended, and no matriculation or municipal records were provided, as required under Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules.

The court also noted inconsistencies in the trial court’s reasoning, as it acquitted the accused of kidnapping (Section 363 IPC) but convicted him under Section 361 IPC, which defines kidnapping. The absence of conclusive evidence of the victim’s age and her testimony supporting the accused led to his acquittal, with the benefit of doubt extended.

#5 S. Harish vs The Inspector of Police (CRL.O.P No.37 of 2024)

• Date: 11 January 2024
• Court: Madras High Court
• Judge: Justice N. Anand Venkatesh
• Neutral Citation: 2024:MHC:5769
• Source: India Kanoon

In the case of S. Harish vs The Inspector of Police, decided on 11 January 2024, the Madras High Court, presided over by Justice N. Anand Venkatesh, quashed the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner in Spl.SC.No.170 of 2023.

The petitioner was booked under Section 67-B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 14(1) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, based on allegations that he had downloaded child pornographic content on his mobile phone. The court noted that the petitioner had not published, transmitted, or created the material in question.

It emphasized that mere private viewing or downloading of such material, though morally questionable, does not amount to a criminal offence under either provision. The judge clarified that Section 14(1) of the POCSO Act requires the accused to have used a child for pornographic purposes, which was not the case here.

Similarly, Section 67-B of the IT Act necessitates active dissemination or creation of the content, which was also absent. The court acknowledged the broader issue of porn addiction among youth due to easy access to adult content through digital platforms and advised the petitioner, who appeared in person and admitted past addiction, to undergo counseling.

In light of these considerations, the court held that continuing the prosecution would amount to an abuse of process and could adversely impact the petitioner’s future. Accordingly, the criminal proceedings were quashed.

#6 Rajkumar S/o Biralal Chakravarti vs State of Maharashtra

• Case Title: Rajkumar S/o Biralal Chakravarti vs State of Maharashtra
• Court: Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench)
• Date of Judgment: 24 January, 2019
• Coram: Hon’ble Justice V. M. Deshpande
• Appeal No.: Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2018

Background:

• Rajkumar Chakravarti was convicted by the Special POCSO Court, Nagpur, under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of IPC and sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment.
• He was accused of repeatedly raping a girl who worked as a maid at the home where he was employed as a watchman.
• DNA evidence showed that Rajkumar was the biological father of the child born to the victim.

Key Findings of the High Court:

The Bombay High Court, while acquitting Rajkumar Chakravarti, made several critical observations that formed the basis of its decision. Firstly, it noted that the prosecution failed to prove the victim’s age beyond doubt, rendering the POCSO charges unsustainable.

Despite DNA evidence confirming Rajkumar as the biological father of the child, the Court emphasized that this alone could not prove rape, especially in the absence of credible evidence of force or coercion.

The victim, who had completed her matriculation and lived with her employers, did not disclose the alleged assaults to anyone until her pregnancy was discovered, despite having numerous opportunities. Her continued silence and lack of resistance suggested the possibility of consensual relations.

The Court also pointed out that the incidents allegedly took place in a guardroom beneath the staircase, not inside the house, and there was no evidence that the victim was taken there forcibly or under threat.

Moreover, the trial court’s reliance on the POCSO presumption under Section 29 was held to be flawed, as the appellant had already been acquitted under that Act. Taking all these factors into account, the High Court concluded that the prosecution had not established guilt beyond reasonable doubt and therefore acquitted the appellant.

Final Decision:

• Conviction under IPC Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 was overturned.
• Rajkumar was acquitted of all charges.
• He was ordered to be released immediately, unless required in any other case.

#7 State (NCT of Delhi) v. Raman Kumar (Crl.A. 1113/2016)

Case Name: State (NCT of Delhi) v. Raman Kumar (Crl.A. 1113/2016)

Summary of Judgment:

• Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
• Judge: Justice Mukta Gupta
• Date: March 17, 2017

Outcome: The respondent, Raman Kumar, was acquitted of charges under Sections 366 (kidnapping to compel marriage or illicit intercourse) and 342 (wrongful confinement) of the IPC, and Section 6 (aggravated penetrative sexual assault) of the POCSO Act, 2012. The State’s appeal against the trial court’s acquittal was dismissed.

Key Reasons for Acquittal:

1. Unreliable Testimony of Child Victim: The child victim (PW-1) admitted in cross-examination that her deposition, including the identification of the accused, was tutored by the police, undermining her credibility. The trial court deemed her a tutored witness, making her testimony unsafe to rely upon.
2. Inconsistencies in Victim’s Account: The victim’s claim of being abducted while going to her grandmother’s house on January 23, 2013, was contradicted by her father (PW-2), who stated she went missing while playing outside her house. Her cross-examination further confirmed she was playing with her sister and others, casting doubt on the abduction narrative.
3. Unnatural Conduct of Victim: The victim did not raise an alarm despite being taken on foot through a familiar street with known shopkeepers. During her alleged two-day captivity, she interacted with neighbors and children and was taken to a hotel for meals but did not report the incident or seek help, which the court found unnatural for a forcibly abducted child.
4. Lack of Corroborative Evidence: The Investigating Officer (IO) failed to examine neighbors, children, or hotel staff who could have corroborated the victim’s presence at the accused’s house. No effort was made to take the victim to the accused’s house to identify witnesses, creating doubt in the prosecution’s case.
5. Delayed Statements: The victim’s statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. were recorded nearly two months after the incident (after the accused’s arrest in another case), despite her returning home within two days. This delay and the absence of immediate reporting weakened the prosecution’s case.
6. Flawed Identification Process: The accused refused a Test Identification Parade (TIP), citing prior exposure to the victim by police. The father’s testimony confirmed the accused was shown to the victim at the police station before formal identification, negating any adverse inference from the TIP refusal and raising doubts about the in-court identification.
7. Rebuttal of POCSO Presumption: Under Sections 30 and 31 of the POCSO Act, there is a presumption of guilt, but the court found this rebutted due to the victim’s unreliable and tutored testimony, lack of corroboration, and questionable identification.
8. Medical Evidence: The medical examination at DDU Hospital was mentioned, but no specific findings (e.g., injuries or sexual assault evidence) were highlighted in the judgment to support the charges.

Legal Reasoning: The trial court’s acquittal was based on the prosecution’s failure to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The victim’s tutored testimony, inconsistencies, unnatural conduct, and lack of independent corroboration created significant doubts. The High Court found the trial court’s reasoning non-perverse, as the evidence did not establish kidnapping, wrongful confinement, or sexual assault under the POCSO Act. The benefit of doubt was extended to the accused, upholding the acquittal.

Order: The State’s appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial court’s acquittal of Raman Kumar for offenses under Sections 366/342 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Any personal or surety bonds of the accused were discharged.

#8 Libnus S/O Fransis Kujur vs State of Maharashtra (2021)

• Court: Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench
• Judge: Pushpa V. Ganediwala
• Date: January 15, 2021
• Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 445 of 2020

Background:

Libnus Kujur, a 50-year-old laborer, was convicted by the Special POCSO Court, Gadchiroli, for offenses under Sections 354-A(1)(i) (sexual harassment) and 448 (house trespass) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and Sections 8, 10, and 12 read with 9(m) and 11(i) of the POCSO Act, 2012, in connection with an incident on February 11, 2018. The prosecution alleged that Libnus entered the house of a five-year-old girl, molested her, and committed aggravated sexual assault.

The informant (the girl’s mother) reported seeing Libnus holding her daughter’s hands and attempting to take her inside a room, with his pant’s zip open. The trial court sentenced him to 5 years of rigorous imprisonment for aggravated sexual assault under Section 10 of the POCSO Act, 1 year of simple imprisonment for house trespass, and fines, with no separate sentence for other charges.

Appeal:

Libnus appealed the conviction, challenging the trial court’s judgment. The High Court reviewed the evidence, particularly the testimony of the informant (PW-1), who was the primary witness, and the applicability of the POCSO Act provisions.

Key Findings:

Evidence Review: The informant’s testimony indicated that Libnus was holding the victim’s hands, attempting to take her inside a room, and had his pant’s zip open. The victim reportedly told her mother that Libnus exposed himself and asked her to come to bed.

Legal Analysis:

• The court examined the definition of “sexual assault” under Section 7 and “aggravated sexual assault” under Section 9 of the POCSO Act. Sexual assault requires physical contact with sexual intent, such as touching specific private parts or similar acts.
• The court found that holding the victim’s hands and having an open zip did not meet the threshold for “sexual assault” under Section 7, as these acts did not involve touching the vagina, penis, anus, or breast, nor were they sufficiently similar to such acts under the principle of ejusdem generis.
• Consequently, the charge of aggravated sexual assault under Section 10 (applicable due to the victim’s age being under 12) was not substantiated.

Conviction Modification:

• The court upheld the convictions under Section 448 (house trespass) and Section 354-A(1)(i) of the IPC (sexual harassment) read with Section 12 of the POCSO Act (sexual harassment of a child).
• The convictions under Sections 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act were quashed, as the acts did not meet the criteria for sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault.

Sentencing:

• The court noted that Libnus had already served approximately 5 months in custody.
• Given the nature of the upheld offenses (house trespass and sexual harassment) and the punishment provided (up to 3 years for sexual harassment and 1 year for house trespass), the court modified the sentence to the time already served, deeming it sufficient.

Outcome:

• The appeal was partly allowed.
• Convictions under Sections 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act were set aside.
• Convictions under Sections 448 and 354-A(1)(i) of the IPC and Section 12 of the POCSO Act were maintained.
• The sentence was reduced to the period already served (about 5 months).
• Libnus was ordered to be released unless required in other cases.

#9 Kanha S/o Hunkar Kowe vs. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 596/2014)

• Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench
• Date: June 5, 2017
• Judge: Z.A. Haq
• Citation: apeal596.14

Background:

Kanha, the appellant, was convicted by the Sessions Court for offenses under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) (rape) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) (aggravated penetrative sexual assault). The case stemmed from the suicide of Nikita Arvichand Sadmake, a 15-year-old girl who jumped into a well on January 23, 2013, allegedly due to depression caused by the appellant’s refusal to respond to her calls.

The prosecution claimed that the appellant had an affair with Nikita, leading to her pregnancy, and her mother lodged a complaint alleging rape and abetment to suicide (Section 306 IPC). The Sessions Court found the appellant guilty of rape and sexual assault but not abetment to suicide.

Key Issues on Appeal:

1. Age of the Deceased: The prosecution relied on a school admission register stating Nikita’s date of birth as July 15, 1999, suggesting she was 15 at the time of the incident. However, this was not supported by a birth certificate, and an ossification test indicated her age as approximately 15–16 years. The Sessions Court did not provide specific findings on her exact age.
2. DNA Evidence: A DNA test confirmed that the appellant and Nikita were the biological parents of the fetus found in her uterus.
3. Applicability of POCSO Act: The POCSO Act came into force on November 14, 2012, and the prosecution failed to establish the age of the fetus or the precise date of the incident, which was allegedly close to the Act’s enforcement date.
4. Age of Consent under IPC: Prior to February 3, 2013, the age of consent under Section 376 IPC was 16 years. The appellant argued that if Nikita was 16, consensual relations would not constitute rape.

Appellant’s Arguments:

• The prosecution failed to conclusively prove Nikita’s age as below 16, relying on an unreliable school record and an ossification test suggesting she could be 16.
• The Sessions Court did not determine the fetus’s age, making it impossible to confirm whether the sexual act occurred before or after the POCSO Act’s enforcement.
• The conviction under Section 376 IPC was unsustainable if Nikita was 16, as the relationship could have been consensual.
• The conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act was invalid due to the lack of evidence pinpointing the incident’s date relative to the Act’s enforcement.

Prosecution’s Position:

The prosecution relied on the DNA report and school records to argue that Nikita was a minor (under 16) and that the appellant committed rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault, leading to her pregnancy and subsequent suicide.

Court’s Findings:

• The High Court found that the prosecution failed to establish Nikita’s exact age, as the school record was not corroborated by a birth certificate, and the ossification test suggested an age range of 15–16 years.
• The absence of evidence regarding the fetus’s age made it impossible to determine the precise date of the sexual act, particularly in relation to the POCSO Act’s enforcement on November 14, 2012.
• The Sessions Court’s failure to address these critical aspects rendered the convictions under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act unsustainable.
• The prosecution could not prove that the sexual act was non-consensual or occurred when Nikita was below the age of consent (16 at the time).

Judgment:

• The High Court set aside the Sessions Court’s judgment.
• The appellant was acquitted of the offenses under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
• The appellant’s bail bonds were canceled, and the court directed that the muddemal property be dealt with as per the Sessions Court’s instructions after the appeal period.
• The appeal was partly allowed.

#10 Dhiren Tanti vs. The State of Assam and Anr (CRL.A(J)/103/2020)

• Court: Gauhati High Court
• Bench: Justice Suman Shyam, Justice Robin Phukan
• Date of Judgment: 4 March 2022

Background:

Dhiren Tanti was convicted by the Sessions Judge, Sonitpur, Tezpur, on 11 February 2020, under Sections 302 (murder) and 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in Special POCSO Case No. 67/2017. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000 for Section 302 and five years with a fine of Rs. 5,000 for Section 201.

The case involved the murder of an 11-year-old girl whose body was found partially buried in a drain in Malijan Tea Estate on 1 November 2017. The prosecution alleged that Tanti raped and murdered the victim and concealed her body. He was acquitted of charges under Section 8 of the POCSO Act due to insufficient evidence.

Prosecution Case:

The prosecution claimed that on 1 November 2017, the victim went with Tanti to collect firewood in a garden at Malijan Tea Estate. She was later found dead, with her body buried in a drain. The case rested on circumstantial evidence, primarily the “last seen together” theory, supported by witnesses who saw Tanti with the victim around the time of the incident. The police recovered the body, allegedly led by Tanti, and an FIR was lodged by the victim’s uncle (PW-3) on 2 November 2017. The investigation resulted in charges under Sections 302/201 IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act.

Evidence:

• PW-1 (Pinki Karmakar, victim’s aunt): Claimed to have seen Tanti dragging the victim into the garden at 2:30 p.m. but her testimony was inconsistent with her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement and deemed unreliable due to contradictions (e.g., not raising an alarm, sending Tanti on an errand later).
• PW-2 (Dr. Mridurupam Gogoi): Conducted the post-mortem, noting lacerated injuries, an absent eyeball, a cloth tied around the neck, and an abrasion on the breast. Death was due to haemorrhagic shock from abdominal blunt trauma, but the time of death was not specified.
• PW-3 (Sankar Ghatowar, informant, victim’s uncle): Stated the victim went with Tanti to collect firewood and her body was found buried. He had limited knowledge of the incident.
• PW-4 (Dipmala Topno, victim’s mother): Found the body after noticing drag marks and a chappal, with villagers’ help. Claimed Tanti fled after the body was found.
• PW-5 (Dasen Nayak) and PW-6 (Kundan Karmakar): Saw Tanti with the victim around 2:00–3:30 p.m., but their accounts varied on timing and circumstances.
• PW-7 (Scientific Officer): Confirmed no spermatozoa in the vaginal swab, ruling out sexual assault.
• PW-8 (S.I. Aminul Islam, Investigating Officer): Arrested Tanti and claimed he led police to the body, but this was unsupported by records or the Case Diary. No items were seized.
• PW-9 (Circle Officer): Conducted the inquest, noting head injuries and a lathi near the body.
• PW-10 (Judicial Magistrate): Recorded statements of PWs-1, 4, 5, and 6 under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
• PW-11 (S.I. Labanya Bezbaruah): Submitted the charge-sheet after PW-8’s transfer.

Defense Arguments:

Mr. A. Ahmed, Amicus Curiae, argued:

1. The prosecution failed to establish the “last seen together” circumstance conclusively, as witness testimonies were contradictory and delayed.
2. No evidence connected Tanti to the murder or body concealment, and the time of death was not established.
3. The claim of Tanti leading to the body’s recovery was unsupported, as the body was found by villagers before his arrest.
4. The tea garden was a public place with many laborers, making third-party involvement possible.
5. Conviction based solely on suspicion and weak circumstantial evidence was unjustified, citing precedents like Jaswant Gir vs. State of Punjab (2005), Sharifa Khatun vs. State of Assam (2020), and Kanhaiya Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (2014).

Prosecution Arguments:

Ms. B. Bhuyan, Additional Public Prosecutor, contended:

1. PWs-1, 5, and 6 confirmed Tanti was last seen with the victim, and their evidence was unimpeached.
2. Tanti’s flight from the scene after the body was found indicated guilt.
3. The chain of circumstances, including “last seen together,” proved the charges under Sections 302/201 IPC.

Court’s Findings:

The Gauhati High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, reasoning:

1. Unreliable Evidence: PW-1’s testimony was contradictory and untrustworthy, as she did not mention Tanti dragging the victim in her Section 164 statement and failed to act despite allegedly witnessing the act.
2. Weak “Last Seen Together” Evidence: PWs-5 and 6 confirmed Tanti was with the victim between 2:00–3:30 p.m., but inconsistencies in timing and lack of evidence of force or unnatural behavior weakened the case. The tea garden’s accessibility to hundreds of laborers suggested possible third-party involvement.
3. Legal Precedents: Citing Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana (1999), Kanhaiya Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (2014), and Ashok vs. State of Maharashtra (2015), the court held that “lastsdag seen together” alone is insufficient for conviction without additional evidence linking the accused to the crime.
4. No Motive: The acquittal under the POCSO Act and lack of evidence for sexual assault eliminated the alleged motive, further weakening the case.
5. No Recovery by Accused: The claim that Tanti led police to the body was unsupported, as PW-4 confirmed the body was found by villagers before Tanti’s arrest on 2 November 2017.
6. Flight Not Conclusive: Tanti’s alleged flight was not incriminating, as he had a plausible explanation (selling a saucepan in Kherbari village, corroborated by PWs-1 and 8).
7. Investigation Flaws: The failure to seize or forensically examine the lathi found near the body and the absence of other incriminating evidence undermined the prosecution’s case.
8. Benefit of Doubt: The evidence raised suspicion but did not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, entitling Tanti to the benefit of doubt.

Outcome:

The court set aside the conviction and ordered Tanti’s immediate release, as he had been in custody since 1 November 2017, unless required in another case. The court appreciated the Amicus Curiae’s efforts and recommended remuneration.

#11 The State of Karnataka vs. Somashekhar @ Pintya (High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench, 20 April 2022)

• Court: High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench
• Judges: Justice K. Somashekar and Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde
• Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 200192/2021
• Parties: State of Karnataka (Appellant) vs. Somashekhar @ Pintya (Respondent)
• Date of Judgment: 20 April 2022
• Appeal Against: Acquittal judgment dated 17 February 2021 by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, FTSC-I (POCSO), Vijayapur, in Special Case (POCSO) No. 30/2016.

Background:

The State appealed against the acquittal of the accused, Somashekhar @ Pintya, who was charged with offenses under:

• Indian Penal Code (IPC): Sections 365 (kidnapping), 344 (wrongful confinement), 376(2)(n) (rape), 504 (insult), and 506 (criminal intimidation).
• Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act: Sections 5(l) and 6 (aggravated penetrative sexual assault).
• Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act: Sections 3(1)(xi) and 3(2)(v).

The prosecution alleged that on 18 May 2016, the accused forcibly abducted the victim (PW-3), a minor, at knifepoint in Vijayapur, threatened her sister (PW-1), and fled with her on a motorcycle. The victim and accused were later traced in Bengaluru after 21 days.

Prosecution Case:

• The complaint (Ex.P-1) by PW-1 (victim’s sister) stated that the accused followed the victim and PW-1, dragged the victim forcibly, threatened them at knifepoint, and abducted her.
• The victim was allegedly held for 21 days, during which no sexual assault was proven. The prosecution claimed the victim was a minor (aged 17-18) based on school records and medical evidence.
• The prosecution examined 22 witnesses (PW-1 to PW-22), marked documents (Ex.P-1 to P-32), and presented material objects (M.O.1 to M.O.6). The victim’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was marked as Ex.D1 to D3.

Trial Court Findings:

The trial court acquitted the accused, finding that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

Key reasons for acquittal:

• Inconsistent and contradictory evidence, particularly between PW-1 (complainant) and PW-3 (victim).
• Lack of credible evidence to support the abduction theory, especially given the victim’s 21-day stay with the accused in Bengaluru without protest.
• Doubts about the victim’s age, with evidence suggesting she could be 18.
• No evidence of sexual assault or injuries on the victim.
• Contradictory statements by the victim (Ex.D1 to D3) and lack of corroboration with other witnesses.

State’s Arguments in Appeal:

• The State argued that the trial court erred in not appreciating the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3, which allegedly corroborated the abduction and threats.
• The prosecution claimed the victim’s minority was established through school records (Ex.P-15) and medical evidence (PW-9, PW-10).
• The State contended that minor discrepancies in witness testimonies should not lead to acquittal and sought reversal of the judgment to convict the accused.

Defense Arguments:

• The defense highlighted contradictions in the victim’s statements (Ex.D1 to D3) and her testimony, particularly regarding the location (Lingasugur vs. Bengaluru) and the abduction narrative.
• The victim’s 21-day stay with the accused in a rented house without protest raised doubts about the abduction claim.
• The defense questioned the victim’s age, noting that school records and the victim’s educational status suggested she could be 18.
• The landlady (PW-13) testified that the victim and accused appeared normal, undermining the prosecution’s theory.
• The defense argued that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the trial court’s acquittal was well-reasoned.

High Court Findings:

The High Court upheld the trial court’s acquittal, dismissing the State’s appeal.

Key Observations:

• The evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 was inconsistent and contradictory, failing to support the prosecution’s theory of forcible abduction.
• The victim’s 21-day stay in Bengaluru without protest or escape attempts weakened the abduction narrative.
• The theory of abduction on a motorcycle in broad daylight in a market area was deemed implausible.
• The landlady’s testimony (PW-13) indicated normal behavior by the victim and accused, further casting doubt on the prosecution’s case.
• The victim’s age was not conclusively proven to be below 18, with evidence suggesting she could be 18.
• The prosecution failed to provide cogent, corroborative evidence to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

Legal Principles Applied:

• The court relied on precedents (e.g., Lalit Kumar Sharma v. Superintendent, AIR 1989 SC 2134 and Anwar Ali v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2020 SAR (Crime) 112) emphasizing that appellate courts should be cautious in overturning acquittals unless the trial court’s findings are perverse or unreasonable.
• The presumption of innocence is strengthened by an acquittal, and interference is warranted only in exceptional cases with compelling reasons.
• Under Section 378 Cr.P.C., the appellate court must re-evaluate evidence but avoid routine interference if the trial court’s view is plausible.

Outcome:

• The High Court rejected the State’s appeal and confirmed the acquittal judgment dated 17 February 2021.
• The court found no compelling reasons to interfere with the trial court’s findings, as the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient and the trial court’s reasoning was consistent with the record.

Additional Note:

• The defense counsel noted that the victim and accused were married and had two children (aged four and one), though this was not a decisive factor in the court’s ruling.

#12 The State vs. Sriram (Crl.A(MD)No.132 of 2016)

In the case The State vs. Sriram (Crl.A(MD)No.132 of 2016), decided on August 3, 2021, by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, the State appealed against the acquittal of the respondent, Sriram, by the Sessions Judge, Mahalir Neethimandram (Fast Track Mahila Court), Thoothukudi, on February 3, 2015. Sriram was charged under Section 366(A) of the IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012, for allegedly kidnapping and sexually assaulting a 15-year-old girl on November 14, 2012.

The prosecution’s case was that the accused took the victim to his house, committed sexual assault, and later exchanged garlands with her before having sexual intercourse again. The victim was rescued by police on November 16, 2012, and medical examination suggested recent sexual intercourse. However, the trial court acquitted the accused, finding that the prosecution failed to prove the victim’s age as below 18 years and that the acts were consensual, negating the applicability of the POCSO Act.

On appeal, the High Court upheld the acquittal. Reasons included:

1. Failure to Prove Victim’s Age: The prosecution relied on a school certificate stating the victim’s date of birth as January 27, 1998, but the certificate lacked supporting documents like a birth certificate or transfer certificate. The victim’s father did not confirm her age, and a radiological age assessment was not conducted despite a medical referral. The victim herself claimed to be 18, which the accused believed, undermining the POCSO Act’s applicability.
2. Consent and Lack of Coercion: The victim admitted to being in a relationship with the accused and exchanging garlands, suggesting consent. The court found no evidence of force, and the accused’s belief that the victim was over 18 further weakened the case under Section 366(A) IPC and Section 4 POCSO Act.
3. Judicial Precedent: Citing Supreme Court rulings, the High Court emphasized that acquittals should not be disturbed unless there are compelling reasons, such as a palpably wrong or illegal judgment. The trial court’s reasoning was found to be well-reasoned and based on evidence.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the acquittal, as the prosecution failed to establish the victim’s minor status beyond a reasonable doubt and the evidence suggested consensual acts based on the accused’s reasonable belief about the victim’s age.

Common Grounds for Acquittal in POCSO Cases

While the POCSO Act was enacted to provide strict protection to children against sexual offences, Indian courts have frequently encountered cases where allegations did not hold up under legal scrutiny. Acquittals in such cases are not a failure of the law, but rather a testament to the judiciary’s responsibility to ensure justice is based on evidence, not emotions or assumptions.

Here are the most common grounds on which courts have acquitted accused persons under the POCSO Act:

1. Lack of Medical or Forensic Evidence

In many cases, courts have noted the complete absence of medical corroboration. When medical reports show no signs of assault or are inconsistent with the victim’s statement, courts may lean towards acquittal. Medical evidence, though not mandatory, plays a critical role in substantiating sexual offence claims.

2. Delay in Lodging the FIR

An unexplained or unreasonable delay in filing the First Information Report (FIR) often weakens the prosecution’s case. Courts have observed that delays give room for fabrication or influence, especially in cases involving personal enmity or family disputes.

3. Contradictory Statements by the Victim

When the victim’s testimony is inconsistent across multiple stages, FIR, medical examination, and court deposition, it raises serious doubts about the credibility of the allegations. Courts require the victim’s statement to be consistent, trustworthy, and free from external influence.

4. Motivated or False Allegations

In several landmark judgments, courts found that allegations were made to settle scores, influence property disputes, or gain leverage in custody battles. If mala fide intent is established, courts do not hesitate to grant relief to the accused.

5. Misidentification of Age

In cases where the age of the alleged victim is close to 18 and poorly documented, courts may question the applicability of the POCSO Act itself. Age verification becomes crucial, especially when the alleged victim was in a consensual relationship.

6. Lack of Independent Witnesses or Circumstantial Evidence

When neither direct nor circumstantial evidence supports the prosecution’s version, courts are bound to give the benefit of the doubt to the accused. Absence of independent witnesses or CCTV footage, especially in public settings, has led to acquittals.

Legal Safeguards for the Accused Under POCSO

While the POCSO Act is primarily focused on protecting children from sexual offences, it also operates within the framework of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees certain rights to every individual, including the accused. These legal safeguards are essential to ensure that the process of justice is not biased, one-sided, or vulnerable to misuse. Over time, courts have reinforced these protections through various judgments, especially in cases where allegations turned out to be false or exaggerated.

1. Presumption of Innocence

Despite the reversed burden of proof under POCSO in some instances, the basic principle of criminal law still applies; the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Courts often emphasize this when evidence is weak or contradictory.

2. Right to a Fair Trial

Every accused person has the right to a fair and impartial trial. This includes legal representation, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and access to all case-related documents. Trials must be conducted transparently and by due process.

3. Protection from False Accusations

Section 22 of the POCSO Act specifically provides punishment for false complaints or false information. If it is found that the allegations were deliberately fabricated, the complainant can be prosecuted. This is meant to deter misuse of the law.

4. Right Against Arbitrary Arrest

Courts have laid down that arrest under POCSO must be based on solid preliminary evidence. Mere allegations, especially those made after a significant delay or in the absence of corroborative medical or documentary proof, are not sufficient grounds for immediate arrest.

5. Right to Bail in Weak Cases

Though POCSO is a stringent law, courts have granted bail in cases where evidence was inadequate, there were inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony, or where the accused had already spent considerable time in custody without trial progression.

6. Judicial Review

Accused persons can seek review of procedural violations during investigation, such as coerced statements, denial of legal counsel, or non-compliance with mandatory guidelines. High Courts and the Supreme Court have frequently intervened in such situations.

Verdict

Over a decade since its implementation, the POCSO Act has significantly transformed the legal response to child sexual abuse in India. It has brought greater clarity, seriousness, and urgency to the handling of such cases, ensuring that child victims receive focused attention and justice through a dedicated legal framework.

However, with its stringent provisions and reversal of the burden of proof, the Act also carries the risk of misuse. Indian courts have repeatedly stressed the need for cautious application, especially in cases where allegations may be false, exaggerated, or motivated by personal disputes. While protecting the rights of the child remains paramount, the judiciary has also emphasized that the rights of the accused cannot be sacrificed in the process.

In multiple cases across the country, courts have acquitted the accused after carefully weighing the evidence and identifying inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. These verdicts reflect the principle that justice must be balanced and based on facts, not merely on allegations.

The following landmark judgments highlight this balance in action. They serve as legal precedents where the courts, while upholding the integrity of the POCSO Act, have also safeguarded the rights of individuals wrongly accused.

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