India’s commitment to religious freedom is enshrined in its Constitution through Articles 25 to 28.

These provisions guarantee that every individual has the liberty to choose, practice, and propagate their religion, while also ensuring that the state does not favor or promote any particular faith.

In a country with a rich tapestry of religious and cultural traditions, these articles play a pivotal role in maintaining social harmony and protecting individual rights.

The Indian notion of secularism differs from the Western model in that it does not demand an absolute separation between religion and the state.

Instead, it seeks to ensure equal respect and treatment for all religions while allowing religious communities to manage their internal affairs.

This detailed discussion will cover:

• The scope of religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution.
• The nuances of individual versus collective rights in religious matters.
• The limitations imposed on religious freedom in the interests of public order, morality, and health.
• Landmark judgments that have shaped the jurisprudence of religious freedom.

Article 25: Freedom of Conscience, and Free Profession, Practice, and Propagation of Religion

Text and Meaning of Article 25

Article 25 of the Indian Constitution states:

“Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.”

This article guarantees individuals the right to:

• Freedom of Conscience: The internal, personal freedom to form, hold, and change one’s beliefs.
• Right to Profess: The ability to openly declare or affirm one’s religious beliefs.
• Right to Practice: The freedom to carry out religious rituals, ceremonies, and worship according to one’s belief system.
• Right to Propagate: The right to spread one’s religious ideas and to communicate religious doctrines to others.

The article emphasizes that while religious freedom is fundamental, it is not absolute. It is subject to restrictions necessary for preserving public order, morality, and health, and it must also conform to other fundamental rights.

Key Elements: Conscience, Profess, Practice, and Propagate

#1 Freedom of Conscience

Freedom of conscience is the cornerstone of religious freedom. It allows every person to develop a personal and private relationship with the divine (or with the philosophical beliefs they hold) without external compulsion.

This inner freedom supports the idea that individuals should be free to choose their beliefs, question them, and change them over time.

#2 Right to Profess

The right to profess religion refers to the public declaration of one’s faith. This means that individuals have the liberty to articulate their religious beliefs through speeches, writings, or acts of worship.

Whether through traditional religious rituals or modern forms of expression, the right to profess ensures that personal belief systems are shared openly.

#3 Right to Practice

The right to practice religion allows individuals to perform religious rituals, ceremonies, and forms of worship that are integral to their faith.

This encompasses activities ranging from daily prayers and attendance at places of worship to the performance of sacraments and other religious ceremonies.

#4 Right to Propagate

Propagation is a distinctive aspect of Article 25. It protects the right of individuals to spread or disseminate their religious ideas.

However, it does not grant the right to forcibly convert others. Propagation must occur voluntarily and should not infringe on another person’s freedom of conscience.

Limitations and Reasonable Restrictions

The freedoms granted by Article 25 come with limitations. These limitations are designed to balance individual rights with broader social interests:

• Public Order: Religious practices that threaten peace, cause disturbances, or incite communal disharmony can be regulated by the state.
• Morality: Practices considered to be against accepted moral standards, such as those that may lead to exploitation or harm, can be restricted.
• Health: Religious activities that compromise public health, such as those involving unsafe practices, may be curtailed.
• Secular Activities: The state retains the power to regulate any economic, financial, or political activities that are associated with religious practice, ensuring that these activities do not disrupt the secular framework of governance.

Landmark Cases Under Article 25

Over the years, the Supreme Court of India has rendered several landmark judgments interpreting Article 25. Some notable cases include:

Shirur Mutt Case (1954)

One of the earliest and most significant cases interpreting Article 25 was the Shirur Mutt case. The Supreme Court held that while the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, this freedom is not absolute.

It is subject to reasonable restrictions on grounds of public order, morality, and health. The case also laid down the “essential religious practice test,” which has since been used to determine which religious practices receive constitutional protection.

Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay (1962)

In this case, the court clarified that the freedom to manage religious affairs under Article 25 does not extend to forced conversion.

The judgment distinguished between propagation (which is protected) and conversion (which is not an absolute right under Article 25). The ruling underscored that religious propagation must be conducted without coercion or allurement.

Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1987) – The National Anthem Case

This case is widely remembered for its discussion on freedom of conscience and expression. Three students were expelled from school for refusing to sing the national anthem on religious grounds.

The Supreme Court ruled that forcing individuals to sing the national anthem against their conscience violated both Articles 19 and 25. The decision reinforced the idea that religious freedom includes the right to refrain from actions that conflict with one’s beliefs.

Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) – The Triple Talaq Case

In a historic judgment, the Supreme Court declared the practice of triple talaq (instant divorce) unconstitutional. While the case primarily dealt with gender justice, it also involved questions about whether certain religious practices are essential to the religion.

The majority opinion held that triple talaq was not an essential part of Islam and that personal laws must be subject to constitutional scrutiny.

Additional Landmark Judgments

Other significant cases include:

• Ramkrishna Mission Cases: Where the courts have examined the interplay between religious customs and state regulation, often clarifying that while cultural practices are protected, they are not immune from regulation if they infringe on public order.
• Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977): The court discussed the limits of propagation and the distinction between voluntary religious expression and coercive conversion.

Article 26: Freedom to Manage Religious Affairs

Article 26: Freedom to Manage Religious Affairs

Text and Meaning of Article 26

Article 26 of the Constitution reads:

“Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have—
(a) the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b) the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) the right to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) the right to administer such property in accordance with law.”

This article is designed to protect the collective rights of religious groups rather than individual rights.

It ensures that religious denominations have the autonomy to regulate their internal affairs and manage their institutions without unwarranted interference from the state.

Rights Conferred on Religious Denominations

Article 26 provides religious denominations with several specific rights:

• Right to Establish and Maintain Institutions: Religious groups have the right to set up and run schools, temples, mosques, churches, and other institutions for religious and charitable purposes.
• Right to Manage Religious Affairs: This includes the freedom to determine internal customs, traditions, and practices.
• Right to Own and Acquire Property: Religious denominations can acquire, hold, and manage property necessary for the fulfillment of their religious functions.
• Right to Administer Property: They can administer and manage their property in accordance with existing laws.

Criteria for Recognizing a Religious Denomination

The Supreme Court has laid down three essential criteria for an entity to be recognized as a religious denomination under Article 26:

1. Collection of Individuals with a System of Beliefs: There must be a group of people who share a common set of religious doctrines or beliefs.
2. Common Organization: The group should be organized in a systematic manner, with established rules and leadership.
3. Distinctive Name: The group must be identifiable by a unique name that signifies its religious identity.

For example, the Supreme Court has recognized organizations such as the Ramakrishna Mission and Ananda Marga as religious denominations within the broader framework of Hinduism, whereas the Aurobindo Society has been viewed differently in terms of its organizational structure and identity.

Limitations and State Regulation

Although Article 26 guarantees substantial autonomy to religious denominations, it is not an absolute right. The freedoms provided are subject to:

• Public Order, Morality, and Health: Like Article 25, any actions by religious groups must not harm public interests.
• State Regulations: The state may regulate economic, financial, and other secular aspects associated with religious practices.

This ensures that while religious groups have significant self-governance, their activities are balanced against the interests of society at large.

Landmark Cases Under Article 26

Several landmark cases have shaped the interpretation of Article 26:

Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1958)

In this case, the Supreme Court emphasized the autonomy of religious institutions. The judgment upheld the right of religious denominations to manage their internal affairs, including the administration of property, without undue interference from the state.

Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (1983)

Commonly known as the Anand Marga case, this judgment clarified that while religious groups are free to manage their affairs, not all practices claimed by them are considered essential.

The Court held that the performance of certain rituals, such as the Tandava dance in public, might not be constitutionally protected if they threaten public order.

Azeez Basha v. Union of India (1967) and Other Cases

Other cases have reinforced that while religious denominations have the right to manage their affairs, this right does not extend to activities that are not essential to the religion or that contravene public interest.

These judgments have helped define the boundaries between internal religious autonomy and state regulation.

Article 27: Freedom from Payment of Taxes for Promotion of Any Particular Religion

Text and Meaning of Article 27

Article 27 states:

“No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are expressly appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.”

This article serves as a bulwark against the state’s involvement in promoting or favoring any particular religion through taxation.

It ensures that public funds are not used to support or advance the interests of any one religion over others.

Ensuring State Neutrality in Religious Matters

The primary purpose of Article 27 is to maintain state neutrality. By prohibiting the compulsory collection of taxes for religious promotion, the Constitution ensures that:

• Public Funds Remain Secular: Tax revenues are used for general public welfare and not directed towards the support of any specific religious group.
• Equal Treatment of All Religions: The state cannot favor one religion over another by providing financial benefits or subsidies that target only a single faith.

Distinguishing Between Taxes and Fees

It is important to note that Article 27 does not preclude the levy of fees. Fees may be charged by religious institutions for services rendered, such as for pilgrimages or for the administration of their properties.

The crucial distinction is that while fees are transactional, taxes are compulsory and are meant to support the functions of the state—not any one religion.

Landmark Cases Under Article 27

Several cases have interpreted Article 27 in a manner that reinforces state neutrality:

The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954)

In this case, the Supreme Court dealt with issues related to contributions and fees collected by religious institutions.

The Court held that while a contribution might be considered a tax, if the funds are used for the administration of religious institutions and not for promoting any particular religion, the action does not violate Article 27.

Aruna Roy v. Union of India (2002)

Although primarily focused on educational policies, the Aruna Roy case touched upon the principles underlying Article 27 by emphasizing that state aid must be distributed in a manner that does not favor any particular religious denomination.

These cases have reinforced the principle that public resources must be used in a way that upholds the secular nature of the state, ensuring that the financial mechanisms of the government do not contribute to religious bias.

Article 28: Freedom from Attending Religious Instruction in State-Funded Educational Institutions

Text and Meaning of Article 28

Article 28 of the Indian Constitution reads:

“(1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution administered by the State but established under any endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such institution.
(3) No person attending any educational institution recognized by the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given his consent.”

Article 28 is designed to ensure that state-funded educational institutions maintain a secular character by prohibiting compulsory religious instruction.

However, it also provides flexibility by allowing religious instruction in institutions that are established under private endowments or trusts.

Scope and Exceptions in Educational Settings

The primary aim of Article 28 is to prevent state-sponsored indoctrination in educational settings. It does so by:

• Barring Religious Instruction: In schools or colleges fully maintained by state funds, religious instruction is not provided as part of the curriculum.
• Consent-Based Participation: Even in institutions where religious instruction is offered (for example, in schools established by religious trusts), attendance is voluntary, and no student can be compelled to participate without consent.
• Classification of Institutions: Article 28 distinguishes among different types of educational institutions based on the source of their funding and administration:
  • Wholly State-Funded Institutions: No religious instruction allowed.
  • State-Administered but Privately Established Institutions: Religious instruction may be provided if required by the trust or endowment, but it remains voluntary.
  • State-Recognized Institutions and Institutions Receiving Aid: Students are not forced to attend religious instruction.

Landmark Cases Under Article 28

D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab (1971)

This landmark case clarified the scope of Article 28 by addressing whether the mandatory inclusion of religious instruction in a state-funded institution violated the constitutional guarantee of secular education.

The Supreme Court ruled that in educational institutions fully funded by the state, religious instruction must be excluded to maintain the secular nature of the education provided.

Aruna Roy v. Union of India (2002)

In another important case, the Supreme Court upheld the principle that while education about religion and culture is permissible, it must not be coercive.

This case reaffirmed that state-supported institutions cannot force religious instruction on students and that any such instruction must be conducted on a voluntary basis, respecting the individual’s right to choose.

Comparative Perspectives on Religious Freedom and Secularism

India’s approach to religious freedom is unique when compared to Western models of secularism. Whereas many Western countries advocate for a strict separation between church and state, India follows a model of “equal respect” for all religions. This means:

• Flexibility in State-Religion Relations: The Indian state may engage with religious institutions in certain administrative or regulatory capacities, provided it does not endorse any particular faith.
• Collective and Individual Rights: While individuals are free to practice their religion (as per Article 25), religious groups are also accorded collective rights to manage their internal affairs (Article 26).
• Balancing Act: The Indian Constitution carefully balances individual liberties with the need to maintain public order and social harmony. This balance is achieved through reasonable restrictions that are unique to the Indian context, where diversity is the norm.

Internationally, the right to freedom of religion is also protected under documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 18) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 18).

However, the Indian Constitution’s detailed provisions and landmark judicial interpretations offer a richer, more nuanced framework for addressing religious freedom in a pluralistic society.

Contemporary Issues and Challenges

Religious Conversions and Forced Conversion Debates

One area where Article 25 has been frequently invoked is in debates surrounding religious conversions. The right to propagate religion, as protected under Article 25, is often at the center of discussions about forced or fraudulent conversions.

While the freedom to propagate is fundamental, the state and the courts have clarified that it does not include the right to forcibly convert another individual.

Recent debates in several Indian states over anti-conversion laws continue to test the boundaries of Article 25.

Gender Justice and Personal Laws

The interpretation of religious freedom has also come under scrutiny in cases involving personal laws.

For instance, in the landmark Shayara Bano case, the practice of triple talaq was struck down on the grounds that it violated constitutional guarantees of gender equality.

This case demonstrated that even long-standing religious practices must conform to constitutional principles, particularly when they infringe on the rights of women.

The Sabarimala Temple Controversy

The Sabarimala temple case brought to the forefront issues of gender discrimination and religious freedom. Traditionally, women of menstruating age were banned from entering the temple, a practice justified on the basis of religious custom.

The Supreme Court’s ruling, which declared the exclusion unconstitutional, reaffirmed that religious practices must evolve in line with contemporary understandings of equality and justice.

State Intervention in Religious Institutions

The right of religious denominations to manage their own affairs under Article 26 has been balanced against the need for state regulation.

Issues arise when religious institutions engage in activities that may threaten public order, financial transparency, or equitable administration.

The state’s power to regulate economic, financial, and political activities associated with religious institutions has led to debates on the extent of such intervention.

Landmark cases have underscored that while internal religious affairs are protected, they are not immune from state oversight, especially when public interests are at stake.

Educational Policies and Religious Instruction

Article 28’s prohibition on compulsory religious instruction in state-funded educational institutions remains a critical safeguard for maintaining secular education.

However, with evolving educational policies and debates over curriculum design, ensuring that education remains free from religious bias is an ongoing challenge.

Recent controversies have included debates on the inclusion of religious content in textbooks and whether state aid should extend to institutions that promote specific religious ideologies.

Judicial Activism and the Evolving Role of the Supreme Court

The Indian judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, has played a vital role in interpreting Articles 25–28. Landmark judgments have not only clarified the meaning of these articles but have also evolved the doctrine of “essential religious practices.”

However, critics argue that in recent times, the judiciary’s stance on religious freedom has sometimes been perceived as overly deferential to state interests, potentially compromising individual liberties.

The evolving political landscape, including debates over secularism and the rise of ideological influences, poses significant challenges to maintaining the impartiality of the judiciary.

Impact of Political Developments

Recent political developments have also affected the discourse on religious freedom. With growing calls for anti-conversion laws and debates on the role of religion in state affairs, the interpretation of Articles 25–28 is more critical than ever.

The interplay between religious freedom, cultural identity, and state policies continues to generate intense public and legal debates.

Landmark Judgements

Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. vs. The State of Kerala & Ors. (2018)

Facts: The case revolved around the ban on the entry of women aged 10 to 50 years into the Sabarimala temple in Kerala. The temple, dedicated to Lord Ayyappa, followed a tradition that considered the deity to be celibate, thereby restricting women of menstruating age from entering the shrine. The Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a petition, arguing that the restriction was discriminatory and unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Does the ban on women violate fundamental rights under Articles 14 (equality), 15 (prohibition of discrimination), 17 (abolition of untouchability), and 25 (freedom of religion)?
2. Is the practice an “essential religious practice” under Article 26?
3. Can religious practices override fundamental rights?

Judgment: The Supreme Court, in a 4:1 majority, struck down the ban and held that it was unconstitutional. The Court ruled that:

• The ban on women was discriminatory and violated Articles 14 and 15.
• Religious practices must conform to constitutional morality, and the custom was not an “essential religious practice” under Article 26.
• The temple’s practice of excluding women reinforced gender discrimination.

Justice Indu Malhotra, in her dissent, argued that religious matters should not be interfered with by courts unless they violate public order, morality, or health.

Bench: Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice R.F. Nariman, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (Majority), Justice Indu Malhotra (Dissenting).

Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta vs. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta & Anr. (1983)

Facts: The Ananda Margi sect, a religious organization, sought permission to perform the Tandava dance—a ritual involving knives and skulls—on public streets. The West Bengal government refused, citing concerns over public safety and order. The sect argued that Tandava was an essential religious practice protected under Article 25.

Issues:

1. Is the Tandava dance an essential religious practice?
2. Can the government restrict religious practices on grounds of public order?
3. Does the ban violate Article 25?

Judgment: The Supreme Court ruled against the Ananda Margis, stating that the Tandava dance was not an essential part of their religion. The Court held that while Article 25 protects religious freedom, it does not extend to practices that disrupt public order or pose a security threat. Since the practice was not fundamental to the faith, the government’s restriction was justified.

Bench: Justice A.P. Sen, Justice D.A. Desai, Justice E.S. Venkataramiah.

The Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. (1974)

Facts: St. Xavier’s College, a Christian minority institution in Gujarat, challenged the state government’s regulations on admissions, faculty appointments, and administration. The college argued that the rules interfered with its rights under Articles 29 and 30, which guarantee minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions.

Issues:

1. Do state regulations infringe upon the rights of minority institutions?
2. Are educational institutions entitled to full autonomy under Article 30?
3. Can the government regulate minority institutions for quality control?

Judgment: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of St. Xavier’s College, affirming that minority institutions have the right to administer their affairs without excessive government interference. However, it also stated that the state can regulate such institutions to maintain educational standards, provided that the regulations do not violate their autonomy.

Bench: Justice A.N. Ray, Justice H.R. Khanna, Justice K.K. Mathew, Justice M.H. Beg.

Shafin Jahan vs. Asokan K.M. (2018)

Facts: Hadiya, a young woman from Kerala, was born a Hindu but converted to Islam and married Shafin Jahan, a Muslim man. Her father, Asokan K.M., filed a habeas corpus petition, claiming she was brainwashed and forcibly converted. The Kerala High Court annulled the marriage, stating that she had been influenced by radical elements. Shafin Jahan then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that Hadiya was an adult and had the right to choose her faith and partner.

Issues:

1. Does the state or judiciary have the authority to annul a valid marriage?
2. Is conversion for marriage protected under Article 25?
3. Can an adult’s choice of religion and marriage be overridden by their parents?

Judgment: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Shafin Jahan and upheld Hadiya’s marriage, stating that she was an adult with the fundamental right to choose her religion and spouse. The Court emphasized that personal choices concerning faith and marriage fall within the ambit of Articles 21 (right to life and liberty) and 25 (freedom of religion). The annulment by the Kerala High Court was overturned.

Bench: Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud.

Church of God (Full Gospel) in India vs. K.K.R. Majestic Colony Welfare & Ors. (2000)

Facts: A church in Tamil Nadu regularly used loudspeakers for prayer sessions, which caused noise pollution in the surrounding residential area. Local residents objected, citing disturbance of peace. The church argued that using loudspeakers was an essential part of its religious practice protected under Article 25.

Issues:

1. Does freedom of religion under Article 25 include the right to use loudspeakers?
2. Can the state impose noise pollution restrictions on religious institutions?
3. Do public health and order take precedence over religious practices?

Judgment: The Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion does not extend to causing public nuisance. It held that no religion mandates the use of loudspeakers, and reasonable restrictions under Article 25(2) can be imposed in the interest of public order, morality, and health. The judgment reinforced the principle that religious practices cannot infringe upon the rights of others.

Bench: Justice K.T. Thomas, Justice R.P. Sethi.

Shri A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (1996)

Facts: A law passed by the Andhra Pradesh government regulated temple administration and the appointment of Archakas (priests). Shri A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu, a hereditary priest, challenged the law, arguing that it violated his rights under Article 25 and Article 26 by interfering in religious matters.

Issues:

1. Can the state regulate temple administration under Articles 25 and 26?
2. Does the appointment of priests fall within the domain of religious freedom?
3. Can secular activities related to religion be subject to state control?

Judgment: The Supreme Court ruled that the management of temples and appointment of priests were secular activities that the state could regulate under Article 25(2). However, it clarified that the government could not interfere in core religious practices. The judgment upheld the law as a means to ensure better governance and inclusivity in temple management.

Bench: Justice K. Ramaswamy, Justice B.L. Hansaria, Justice S.C. Sen.

Atheist Society of India, Nalgonda vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh (1992)

Facts: The Atheist Society of India filed a petition challenging the allocation of state funds to religious institutions, arguing that it violated India’s secular character under Articles 25-28. They claimed that public funds should not be used to support any religion.

Issues:

1. Does state funding for religious institutions violate secularism?
2. Can the government use public money for religious purposes under Article 27?
3. Are such allocations discriminatory against non-religious groups?

Judgment: The Court ruled that while the state must maintain secularism, certain grants to religious institutions for cultural or heritage preservation do not violate the Constitution. However, direct promotion of religion using state funds was deemed unconstitutional under Article 27.

Bench: Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah, Justice A.M. Ahmadi.

Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala (1986)

Facts: Three Jehovah’s Witness students in Kerala refused to sing the national anthem in school, citing religious beliefs. They stood in respect but did not participate. The school expelled them, leading their parents to challenge the decision as a violation of Article 25.

Issues:

1. Does forcing students to sing the national anthem violate religious freedom?
2. Can the state impose civic duties that conflict with religious beliefs?
3. Are students protected under Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech) and Article 25?

Judgment: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the students, stating that freedom of religion includes the right to practice one’s faith without coercion. The Court held that their silent respect for the anthem was sufficient, and expelling them violated their fundamental rights.

Bench: Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy.

Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (1961)

Facts: The government passed the Dargah Khawaja Saheb Act to regulate the management of the Ajmer Dargah. Some Muslim petitioners challenged this, arguing that it interfered with their religious autonomy under Article 26.

Issues:

1. Can the state regulate religious institutions?
2. Does government control over religious endowments violate Article 26?
3. Can religious management be separated from religious practices?

Judgment: The Supreme Court ruled that administration and management of religious institutions are secular functions that can be regulated. However, the state cannot interfere in core religious beliefs. The Act was upheld as a means of ensuring proper management.

Bench: Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K.N. Wanchoo.

M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994)

Facts: Following the Babri Masjid demolition, the government acquired the disputed land in Ayodhya. Muslim petitioners challenged this under Article 25, arguing that it violated their right to worship.

Issues:

1. Is a mosque an essential religious place under Islam?
2. Can the government acquire religious land?
3. Does acquisition violate Article 25?

Judgment: The Supreme Court held that a mosque is not essential for practicing Islam, as prayers can be offered anywhere. The government’s acquisition was upheld, and the dispute was left for civil courts to decide.

Bench: Chief Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah.

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)

Facts: The central government dismissed state governments that were accused of violating secularism. The dismissed states argued that the action was unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Is secularism a basic feature of the Constitution?
2. Can the President dismiss a state government for violating secularism?
3. Does religious bias in governance justify dismissal under Article 356?

Judgment: The Supreme Court ruled that secularism is a fundamental part of the Constitution. It upheld the dismissal of state governments that acted against secular principles.

Bench: Justice P.B. Sawant, Justice Kuldip Singh, Justice S.R. Pandian.

Verdict

Articles 25 to 28 of the Indian Constitution are foundational to ensuring religious freedom in one of the world’s most diverse societies.

They embody India’s commitment to allowing individuals to choose, practice, and propagate their religion while ensuring that the state remains neutral in matters of faith.

Through detailed provisions and landmark judicial interpretations, these articles have shaped a unique model of secularism that balances individual liberties with collective rights.

• Article 25 guarantees personal freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion—subject to reasonable restrictions for maintaining public order, morality, and health.
• Article 26 protects the collective right of religious denominations to manage their own affairs, including the establishment and maintenance of institutions and the management of property.
• Article 27 upholds state neutrality by ensuring that no person is compelled to contribute financially to the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion.
• Article 28 safeguards the secular nature of state-funded educational institutions by prohibiting compulsory religious instruction while allowing voluntary participation in non-state educational settings.

Landmark cases such as the Shirur Mutt case, Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, and Shayara Bano v. Union of India have reinforced these constitutional guarantees, setting judicial precedents that continue to influence the interpretation and application of these rights.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Q1. What does Article 25 guarantee?

Article 25 guarantees every person the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate their religion. This includes the rights to form, hold, and express personal beliefs without coercion.

Q2. How does Article 26 differ from Article 25?

While Article 25 protects individual rights to religious freedom, Article 26 ensures that religious denominations or groups have the right to manage their own affairs, establish institutions, and administer property. It is a collective right designed for organized religious bodies.

Q3. Can the state interfere with religious practices under Article 25?

Yes, the state may impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights under Article 25 in the interests of public order, morality, and health, and to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice.

Q4. What is the significance of Article 27?

Article 27 prevents the state from compelling individuals to pay taxes for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion. This provision upholds the principle of state neutrality and ensures that public funds are not used to favor any single religion.

Q5. How does Article 28 protect secular education?

Article 28 prohibits the provision of religious instruction in educational institutions wholly maintained out of state funds, ensuring that students are not compelled to attend religious classes. It allows religious instruction only in institutions established under private endowments or trusts, and even then, participation must be voluntary.

Q6. What is meant by “essential religious practices” in the context of these articles?

“Essential religious practices” refer to the fundamental rituals and customs that are integral to a religion. The judiciary uses this test to determine which practices receive constitutional protection, ensuring that non-essential or potentially harmful practices can be regulated by the state.

Q7. How have landmark cases influenced the interpretation of these articles?

Landmark judgments such as the Shirur Mutt case, Bijoe Emmanuel, Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb, and Shayara Bano have clarified the scope and limitations of religious freedom in India. They have established judicial standards for what constitutes essential religious practices, the limits of state interference, and the balance between individual rights and public interest.